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Asymmetric Dominance Effects in  
Choice Experiments and Contingent Valuation 
 
 
Abstract 
While a dominated choice involves a situation in which one option clearly dominates another 
on all relevant dimensions, an asymmetrically dominated choice typically involves more than 
two options in which at least two options do not dominate each other but one (but not both) of 
those options does dominate a third option. We demonstrate that the introduction of an 
asymmetrically dominated option can significantly impact upon choices between non-
dominated options within the same choice set. Furthermore, we show that this effect can then 
translate into significant impacts upon subsequent valuations for those non-dominated options. 
Such findings are at odds with standard theory yet accord with a substantial number of 
findings within the marketing and experimental economics literatures. More fundamentally 
these results show that the introduction of alternatives which are, from a formal perspective, 
irrelevant can significantly impact upon non-market valuation estimates derived from both 
choice experiments and contingent valuation studies. We consider the impact of such effects 
and their implications for future valuation research.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, a number of “anomalies” observed in stated preference studies for 
non-market goods have subsequently been found to occur in purchases of market priced 
goods (see for example the ‘part-whole’ effect; Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Bateman et al., 
1997). In this paper we reverse this demonstrative flow by examining whether a particular 
choice set phenomenon widely demonstrated in the marketing and psychological literatures, 
and borne out in experimental economic settings and real market observations, carries over to 
hypothetical non-market valuation and public goods choice settings.  Our particular focus 
here is on asymmetric dominance effects. While a dominated choice involves a situation in 
which one option clearly dominates another on all relevant dimensions, an asymmetrically 
dominated choice typically involves more than two options in which one option is dominated 
by at least one other option, but not by all options. Figure 1 illustrates asymmetric dominance 
in the case where options vary along two dimensions, which are labelled in accordance with 
the goods that are discussed later in the article. In this figure, d is dominated by t, but not by c. 
An asymmetric dominance effect is an example of a broader class of decoy phenomena 
(Herne, 1997, 1999), which refer to the effects on choices between two options (the target: t 
and the competitor: c) that results from the introduction of an additional option (the decoy: d). 
An asymmetric dominance effect is then said to occur if the addition of an asymmetrically 
dominated decoy increases the share of the target (Huber, Payne, and Puto, 1982).   
[Figure 1 here] 
Decoy effects in general and asymmetric dominance effects in particular have 
attracted attention of psychologists and experimental economists because rational choice 
theory posits that preferences between two options should not depend upon the presence or 
absence of any other options. It follows that if t is not chosen from a binary choice set B={c, 
t}, then t cannot be the preferred choice in the more encompassing choice set E={c,t,d}.  This 
principle, known as expansion consistency (Sen, 1982) is embodied in standard models of 
rational choice (Tversky and Simonson, 1993) and, given monotonicity, implies the absence 
of asymmetric dominance effects.  At an aggregate level, the parallel to the expansion 
consistency restrictions on individual choice is the regularity condition (Huber, Payne and 
Puto, 1982).  Formally, letting C(B) = c denote that alternative c is chosen from the choice set 
B and P(c, B) indicate the proportion of people for whom C(B) = c, the regularity condition is 
defined as  
P(c, B) > P(c,E)      (1) 
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Regularity is a weaker condition than expansion consistency, because even when regularity 
holds at the aggregate, individuals may still violate expansion consistency. Nevertheless, from 
the perspective of choice experiments, regularity remains a minimally desirable condition. It 
follows that failure of the regularity condition, in the form of an asymmetric dominance effect 
may have serious consequences for the acceptability of choice experiments. 
Evidence of asymmetric dominance effects are widely demonstrated in the 
experimental and consumer choice literature (see for example Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982; 
Ranteshwar, Shocker and Stewart, 1987; Lehman and Pan, 1994).  As an example, Rabin 
(1998) discusses an asymmetric dominance experiment conducted by Simonson and Tversky 
(1992) that examined choices between receiving $6 and a Cross pen. (Cross is a manufacture 
of elegant pens in the United States)  
“While only 36 percent of the subjects choosing only between the Cross pen 
and $6 chose the Cross pen, 46 percent of subjects who were also given the 
choice of a less attractive pen chose the Cross pen…the addition of an option 
that compared unfavorably (as more expensive or lower quality) to an existing 
option enhanced the perceived attractiveness of the existing option” (p. 38) 
Other researchers have demonstrated that such effects appear to be general, and extend 
to other choice situations such as political candidates (Pan, O’Curry and Pitts, 1995), job 
candidates (Highhouse, 1996) and policy issues (Herne, 1997). While much of this research 
has utilized hypothetical choice tasks, Simonson and Tversky (1992) and Herne (1999) 
demonstrate that asymmetric dominance effects persist in choice experiments involving real 
incentives. More recently asymmetric dominance effects have been observed in real markets 
for commonly purchased goods. An interesting example of such phenomena is provided by 
Doyle et al. (1999), who conduct a real world investigation regarding purchases of tins of 
baked beans in a supermarket. Here the researchers initially monitored sales of two brands of 
beans, both sold in the same large can size, over the course of a week. This showed that one 
brand, which we can designate as Brand X, accounted for just 19% of sales despite being 
cheaper than the leading brand. The researchers then introduced a decoy good, namely a line 
of small tins of Brand X sold at the same price as a large can. Sales from the following week 
showed that, while (unsurprisingly) no purchases of the decoy were made, market share of 
Brand X had increased significantly (p = 0.034) to 33% of sales so cutting sales of the leading 
brand from 81% to 67%.  
  4 
The fact that the asymmetric dominance effect increases the relative, and in some 
cases the absolute, proportion of choices favouring the more proximate target runs counter to 
the “similarity hypothesis” that new items take share from existing items that are the most 
similar (Tversky, 1972).  Efforts by psychologists and market researchers to explain this 
phenomenon can be broadly categorized as perceptual effects and decision-making processes.  
With regards to the former, the addition of an asymmetrically dominated decoy extends the 
unfavourable dimension of the target more than the favourable dimension, making the target’s 
deficit in the unfavourable dimension seem less great (Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982; Huber 
and Puto, 1983).  Increased frequency of items in the dimension on which the target is 
superior may increase the weight placed on that dimension (Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982).  
With respect to decision-making processes, Simonson (1989) argues that individuals seek to 
justify their choices in the face of uncertainty, especially in cases that they may be concerned 
about external evaluation of their decisions: the target may be more “attractive” because its 
superiority is unambiguous and independent of subjective preferences; the target may be 
regarded as a “compromise” that combines desirable attributes of the other choices.  
Underlying decision processes may be driven by an “extremeness aversion” (Simonsen and 
Tversky, 1992) or the application of simplifying decision heuristics to minimize decision 
costs (Wedell, 1991).    Wedell (1991) identifies further psychological, decision-making 
processes that may engender such effects. 
It is evident, however, that the asymmetric dominance effect is not isolated to the 
human psyche – it may be that we are “hard wired” to make choices using  comparative, 
context-dependent criteria rather than to value options independently.   Shafir, Waite and 
Smith (2002) note: 
“We tested the choices of honeybees and gray jays in binary and trinary 
contexts.  According to the theories of rational choice and optimal foraging, 
the subjective values assigned to two preexisting options should not be 
affected by the presence or absence of a third option.  However, our subjects 
were affected by the presence of an asymmetrically dominated decoy just like 
human subjects…” (p. 185) 
 
Given the clear impact on familiar and regularly purchased products in humans and 
replication in foraging by other species, we feel justified in investigating whether this effect 
will replicate for less familiar environmental non-market goods for which preferences should, 
if anything, be more malleable. 
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Our research extends the literature on asymmetric dominance in two key ways: first by 
demonstrating that this phenomenon is exhibited in choices and expressed preferences for 
non-marketed environmental goods.  Perhaps more importantly, this research also provides 
the first demonstration that values, and not just choices, are affected by the introduction of an 
asymmetrically dominated decoy.  Such a result is of general economic interest, but is 
particularly critical in the context of the recent increased use of choice experiments in valuing 
non-market goods, since it suggests that conjoint and other choice methods may be subject to 
the same systematic biases documented in the psychology and marketing literatures.   We 
further argue that the findings presented in this paper provide a possible explanation of  why 
non-market values derived from choice experiments seem to exceed values obtained from 
methods that elicit values for only one good (Cameron et al. 2002).   
 
2. Design and Hypotheses. 
The data are taken from a study of proposed environmental management strategy 
options for Ranworth Broad in East Anglia, U.K. (a Broad is a colloquial East Anglian term 
for lake). In an in-person, on-site survey of visitors to the Broad, respondents were presented 
with information concerning two distinct environmental attributes (A1, A2) which were 
increased from present day levels by different extents: the first attribute (A1) concerned an 
increase in the number of birds at the Broad; the second attribute (A2) concerned an increase 
in the amount of plant cover at the Broad. Increases in attribute A1 were measured as 
numbers of additional birds whereas increases in attribute A2 were measured as percentages 
over the current level of plant cover.  The analysis presented in this paper concerns responses 
to linked choice and valuation questions, both concerning changes in bird numbers and plant 
cover detailed above. The choice task was presented prior to the valuation task with a 
principle aim being to see (i) if asymmetric dominance effects occurred in the former and if so 
(ii) whether such an effect would then impact upon a subsequent valuation task concerning 
the same provision change.  
A split sample design was employed with one subsample being presented with a 
choice between options c = (100, 30) and t = (150, 20), i.e. the choice set {c,t}.  The second 
subsample was offered an expanded choice set {c,t,d}, that is c and t plus  d=(140, 15).1  As 
demonstrated in Figure 1, d is dominated in both dimensions by t.  In contrast the movement 
                                                 
1 This design represents a sharp simplification of the typical conjoint design, where usually attribute levels are 
varied across subjects in order to estimate values attached to the attributes. We use such a simple design to 
concentrate on the point at issue (asymmetric dominance) 
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in outcome space from c to d would involve an increase in A1 by 40 and a decrease in A2 by 
15.  Thus, d is dominated by t but not c.  
In both subsamples, respondents made their decisions based upon numerical 
information presented to them on a showcard (letters c, t and d were not used on the cards).  
The cards were structured in a table format so as to make assimilation of the information as 
easy as possible.  In the choice task respondents were simply asked to identify their preferred 
option from the two or three presented to them. The subsequent valuation exercise used a 
simple open-ended question to elicit willingness to pay for the chosen (preferred) option, 
payment being made via a general tax vehicle as used in previous in-person CV survey 
research on the Norfolk Broads (Bateman et al., 1995).  
The questionnaire survey was conducted at the Ranworth Broad Nature Reserve 
visitor centre in the Norfolk Broads employing face-to-face interviewing techniques. 
Approximately half of the questionnaires were completed within the visitor centre (beside the 
entrance) and the other half outside the entrance as they entered the building. Members of the 
public who agreed to respond to a ten-minute questionnaire were assigned at random to one of 
the two treatments.  The refusal rate was only 4 percent reflecting the prior commitment of 
visitors to this area.  A total of 294 subjects were interviewed. Prior to each decision task, all 
respondents were provided with some background information to the scenario.  This material 
was designed so as to be as unbiased towards any particular attribute as possible.  
Furthermore, it was emphasized that there were no correct answers and that the respondent 
should respond according to their own preferences. As will be demonstrated later, the random 
assignment of surveys provided samples with statistically identical characteristics. 
Given this data, we examine four hypotheses. The first hypothesis is concerned with 
testing the null hypothesis of description invariance, with the alternative hypothesis being that 
the regularity conditions are violated.  Formally, 
 
Ho1: P(t,B) =  P(t, E)      H
A
1: P(t,B) <  P(t, E)       
  
Hypothesis Ho1 states that the probability of choosing the target good t does not vary 
systematically according to whether or not the dominated decoy d is present or absent in the 
choice set; it tests the standard assertion that d is an irrelevant alternative. Testing Ho1 is 
accomplished by standard contingency table analyses to test whether the relative shares of t 
and c change with the addition of an asymmetrically dominated decoy.  A one-sided test of 
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proportions is used to explore the alternative hypothesis that the regularity condition is 
violated for the target t. 
The second hypothesis involves conditional tests of asymmetric dominance effects 
upon choice. This is assessed by modelling individual choice as a function of covariates.  
Formally this hypothesis is stated as follows,  
Ho2: P(t,B; m) = P(t,E; m)    H
A
2: P(t,B; m) < P(t,E; m) , 
where m is a vector of exogenously determined preferences and socio-economic 
characteristics of the respondents. Adopting a random utility modelling framework, this 
hypothesis test is conducted using a probit model in which the dependent variable is whether t 
is chosen or not.  The significance of the coefficient for the binary variable indicating whether 
the decoy was present in the choice set provides the test of whether the null hypotheses Ho2 
can be rejected in a manner consistent with an asymmetric dominance effect.  This, in 
conjunction with the sign of the coefficient, provide insights into whether or not the 
alternative hypothesis should be accepted. 
Finally, in our last two hypothesis tests, we examine the procedural variance null 
hypothesis that values are not affected by the addition of a decoy to the choice set.  This 
investigation takes two forms.  First we focus on whether the “average” valuation is affected 
by the addition of the decoy, where μ indicates that the preferred choice in a costless setting is 
the choice being valued: 
Ho3:  V((B)) = V((E))  
No alternative directional hypothesis is specified.  Rejection of Ho3 simply provides an 
indicator of whether the addition of an asymmetrically dominated decoy influences values 
placed on the preferred option expressed by individuals without distinguishing between which 
option, c or t, was chosen. 
 We next examine whether stated values for the preferred choice vary with the choice 
set. 
Ho4:  V(x,B) = V(x,E)   for x = c, t 
Because expectations associated with this test may depend upon the outcome of the previous 
hypotheses, and because of the possibility of preference reversals (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 
1971; Irwin et al., 1993), no alternative directional hypothesis is specified at this point. 
Nevertheless, the empirical direction of any impact remains a primary interest of this research, 
as will be discussed.  
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 The third and fourth hypotheses are evaluated following the treatment effects 
modelling framework initially discussed in Barnow, Cain and Goldberger (1980).   Although 
a full information maximum likelihood estimator is used, this model is most readily described 
by analogy to the well-known “two-step” selection model developed by Heckman (1976) 
wherein z is an indicator variable for the presence or absence of a treatment. In our situation, z 
distinguishes between the choice of t (z=1) or c (z=0), which is modelled in the “first step” or 
selection model using a binomial probit model.  The differentiating feature of the treatment 
effects model from the standard selection model is that the treatment effect is endogenous in 
the “second step” of the modelling process and all observations (rather than a selected 
subsample) are included in the second step. Formally, following Greene (2002, 2003, 2004), 
letting WTP = the observed willingness to pay value and WTP* be the corresponding latent 
variable, the specification of the tobit modeli with treatment effects is 
 
],,,,0,0[~      ,
,0*z if 0          
,0*z if 1          
,           z*
otherwise, *WTP   WTP0,  WTP* if 0     WTP
,*WTP
22 

 uNu
z
z
u
z





wα'
xβ'
  
where x and w are vectors of covariates and  and,αβ are coefficients to be estimated.   The 
standard deviations are 22  and u  , and the covariance is 
22
u (Greene, 2002, 2003).   
 
3. Results 
3.1. Regularity test of asymmetric dominance effects on choice shares: H1 
Table 1 details the choice shares for the various options offered to our two choice task 
subsamples. Consideration of these findings reveals clear evidence of asymmetric dominance 
effects.  When no decoy is included in the choice set, the choice between target and 
competitor are approximately evenly split.   With the addition of the asymmetrically 
dominated decoy, it is evident that the choice shares change substantially with the proportion 
of respondents choosing t increasing noticeably.   Only one of the respondents acted 
“irrationally”, choosing the decoy rather than the preferred alternative.  This individual is 
excluded from subsequent analyses. Using standard chi-square tests, the choice shares of c 
and t are significantly different (Table 1, All data: 21 11.14, p < 0.01; Table 1, Respondents 
reporting WTP data: 21 8.91, p<0.01) across choice sets.  This leads to a rejection of the 
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null hypothesis Ho1, indicating that the addition of an asymmetrically dominated decoy does 
indeed affect the choice shares.  A one-sided test of proportions indicates that the alternative 
hypothesis, that the regularity conditions with respect to t, are violated, a finding that 
demonstrates that asymmetric dominance effects carry over to violations of the regularity 
conditions in choices involving environmental goods.  
[Table 1 here] 
 
3.2. Conditional tests of asymmetric dominance effects on individual choice: H2. 
For both the ‘With Decoy’ and ‘No Decoy’ subsamples, Table 2 provides, descriptive 
statistics for the exogenous choice covariates included in the econometric analysis. These 
include standard demographic and socio-economic characteristics such as gender, age and 
income.  Also included are indicators of how frequently the individual uses the resource and 
membership in environmental organizations.  Using Chi-square contingency table analyses 
for the binary variables and independent difference of mean t-tests for the continuous 
variables, none of the covariates used were found to be significantly different between the 
‘With Decoy’ and ‘No Decoy’ subsamples.  
[Table 2 here] 
Binomial Probit selection models allowing for exogenous socio-economic covariates 
are provided in Table 3 using both the full sample and the observations for which WTP values 
were reported.  The “long” analyses includes all the aforementioned covariates, regardless of 
significance level.  The “short” analysis retain only those that passed a pre-test criteria of 20 
percent: i.e., income, and membership in specific environmental organizations.  The two 
membership covariates tend to shift choices in alternative directions: membership in the 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) is associated with a rise in the likelihood of 
choosing the alternative that favoured birds (a reassuringly common sense result); 
membership in less specific “Green” organizations such as Friends of the Earth is correlated 
with choosing the competitor (more plants – again this seems a plausible and interesting 
result).  As might be expected for a costless choice, income is not significant in any of the 
selection models. 
[Table 3 here] 
Given these covariates, the probit results demonstrate significant impacts of adding the 
decoy to the choice set (p < 0.01) as demonstrated by the coefficient on the With Decoy 
variable.  As such, Ho2, the null hypothesis of no asymmetric dominance effect, can be 
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rejected.   The positive and significant sign on the With Decoy variable further suggests that 
asymmetric dominance effects observed in other choice settings can be extended to the realm 
of tradeoffs between environmental goods. 
3.3Expansion of the Choice Set and Average WTP – H3 
Willingness to pay values by choice set and choice are provided in Table 4.  Examination 
of this 2X2 matrix of values suggests that, ignoring for the moment issues of the endogeneity 
of treatment choices, average WTP for t is higher than average WTP for c, and that the 
addition of the decoy increases the average WTP for t.  There appears to be a smaller 
downward effect on average WTP for c when an asymmetrically dominated t is added. 
[Table 4 here] 
The selection model described above was expanded to the treatment effects framework 
by including the predicted choice as an endogenous variable in the second stage Tobit 
regression.  In the “Average WTP” regression, depicted in the left-hand columns of Table 5, 
WTP is the dependent variable, and the independent variables include the set of covariates in 
the long model discussed above.  In addition, the “treatment” variable (i.e. the choice of c or t 
as represented by “Chose t”) is included as an endogenous variable as previously specified – 
that is the predicted value for “Chose t” from the “first stage” probit analysis is used as an 
endogenous variable in the “second stage” Tobit analysis.ii 
 [Table 5 here]  
Evaluating first the socio-economic covariates, only gender and age do not pass the pre-test 
significance level of 20 percent.  Hence they are not included in the short Tobit model.  
Income and frequency of visits are each significant and positive, reflecting standard 
expectations for WTP.   WTP is positively correlated with membership in the RSPB, and 
negatively correlated with membership in a Green organization. 
 Focusing on the With Decoy effect, we see that adding a decoy is correlated with a 
positive and significant increase in WTP.   This suggests that, on average, the addition of a 
decoy to a choice set will elevate the WTP function for the remaining options in the choice set.  
The existence of a treatment effect is indicated by the positive and significant ρ. 
3.4 Expansion of the Choice Set and Conditional  WTP:  H4 
The last two columns of Table 5 provide the corrected Tobit estimates in the treatment 
effects model that distinguishes between the preferred choice (i.e. c or t) for which values 
were subsequently elicited.  We focus on the coefficients of the binary variables D(chose c), 
D(decoy) and D(chose t)*D(decoy), which replace the With Decoy variable in the previous 
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analyses. These variables, in conjunction with the Chose T variable, allow us to isolate the 
WTP values for each of the quadrants in Table 4.  If we define D(chose t) = 1- D(chose c), 
then the four possible combinations are provided below. 
 c t 
B ={c,t} Chose c = 1 
D(decoy) = 0 
Chose t = 1 
D(Decoy) = 0 
E={c,t,d} Chose c = 1 
D(decoy) = 1 
Chose t = 1 
D(decoy) = 1 
 
As such, c=C(B)  serves as the baseline in the regression.  Our interest at this point is on the 
binary variables represented in the shaded portion of the above.  That is, relative to the 
baseline, D(chose c)*D(decoy) isolates the effect on WTP of adding the decoy for those 
individuals that chose c.  Similarly, D(chose t)*D(decoy) isolates the effect on WTP of adding 
the decoy for those individuals that chose t. 
 As indicated in Table 5 the sign of the decoy effect is positive in both cases. WTP for 
c is not significantly affected by the addition of the decoy to the choice set.  However, the 
decoy effect on WTP for t is large and statistically significant at the 1% level by the addition 
of the decoy to the choice set. To put this is in an economic perspective, note that the size of 
the decoy effect on WTP is of a similar order of magnitude to the impact of being a frequent 
visitor to the area.  Again ρ is significant, indicated the presence of a treatment effect. 
 Using sample means of the covariates associated with each of the samples 
corresponding to the 2X2 matrix above, the estimated conditional willingness to pay values 
(and corresponding standard errors) are 13.52 (0.09), 14.14 (0.09), 10.46 (0.15) and 22.63 
(0.10) for the No Decoy/Chose c, No Decoy/Chose t, With Decoy/Chose c, and With 
Decoy/Chose t samples, respectively.  These predicted, sample specific and treatment 
corrected values, mirror trends observed in the raw data: the addition of a decoy has a strong 
upward effect on WTP for the target; there is evidence of a downward effect on WTP for the 
competitor for this sample. 
 
4. Discussion 
 Using a data set from a study of proposed environmental management strategy options 
for a lake in the U.K., this research demonstrates that the asymmetric dominance decoy 
effects widely observed in the psychological and marketing literatures are also manifested in 
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environmental management choice situations.  Furthermore, we demonstrate that this choice 
anomaly carries over to subsequent valuation exercises.  Specifically, we find that the average 
WTP for a good is significantly larger when it dominates an inferior option in a prior choice 
set.  
The demonstration of asymmetric dominance effects within choice experiments for 
non-market environmental goods, and the consequential effect upon stated values is we 
contend an important result. It continues the tradition noted at the start of this paper of 
anomalies being established within both market priced and non-market goods. Indeed the 
presence of the asymmetric dominance effect simply confirms the fact that preferences for 
non-markets goods are generally speaking not inherently different from those for market 
priced goods; they even share the same anomalies.  
This research suggests that biases or anomalies found in other choice settings will also 
be found in choices regarding public environmental goods.  One perspective of this result is 
positive: hypothetical decisions about public issues are subject to similar inconsistencies that 
are found in everyday decisions involving real commitments.  However, these results also 
suggest caution as researchers endeavour to expand non-market valuation analyses into 
decision settings involving wider and more varied choice sets. Since the early work on 
conjoint analysis in marketing (e.g. Green and Wind, 1973, Malhotra, 1982) it is been well 
known that the size of the choice set and the numbers of attributes can affect estimates of 
welfare values. In that context DeShazo and Fermo, 2002, demonstrate the value of building 
in to the design of a choice experiment the systematic exploration of the impact of choice 
complexity. They recommend such a procedure to practitioners. In a similar manner, we 
suggest that researchers using stated preference techniques build into the instrument design 
tests of asymmetric dominance and the wider class of decoy effects.   
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Figure 1. Asymmetric Dominance. 
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Table 1. Choice Shares by Choice Set  (Cell contents are counts with corresponding 
subsample proportions given in parentheses) 
 c t d 
 All Data 
{c,t} 72 (50%) 72 (50%) ----- 
{c,t,d} 46 (31%) 103 (69%) 1 (<1%) 
 Respondents Reporting WTP 
{c,t} 62 (48%) 68 (52%) ----- 
{c,t,d} 42 (30%) 97 (70%) 1 (<1%) 
 
Note: As defined in the text and demonstrated in Figures 1 and 2, c refers to the competitor, t 
refers to the target, and d refers to the decoy.  Note that d is asymmetrically dominated by t. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.) 
All 
Respondents 
“No 
Decoy” 
Sample 
“With 
Decoy” 
Sample 
Respondents 
Reporting 
WTP 
“No 
Decoy” 
sample 
“With 
Decoy” 
sample 
With Decoy  
(binary, 1 if{c,t,d,}, 
zero if {c,t}) 
0.508 
 
0 1 0.519 
 
0 1 
Household Income 
(£000, continuous, set 
at midpoint of income 
brackets) 
25.14 
(14,183) 
23.976 
(14,473) 
26.275 
(13,852) 
25.000 
(14,174) 
23.923 
(14,565) 
26.000 
(13,778) 
Frequent visitors  
(binary, 1 if visits/year 
> 2, zero otherwise) 
0.184 
 
0.188 
 
0.181 
 
0.193 
 
0.192 
 
0.193 
 
Gender  
(binary, 1 if female, 
zero otherwise) 
0.495 
 
0.500 
 
0.490 
 
0.496 
 
0.500 
 
0.493 
 
Age 
(continuous, in years) 
41.57 
(16.87) 
41.31 
(16.88) 
41.82 
(16.91) 
41.10 
(16.97) 
40.51 
(16.92) 
41.65 
(17.06) 
RSPB 
(binary, 1 if member of 
the Royal Society for 
the Protection of Birds, 
zero  otherwise.) 
0.177 
 
0.153 
 
0.201 
 
0.178 
 
0.169 
 
0.186 
 
Greens 
(binary, 1 if member of 
green organizationa, 
zero otherwise) 
0.191 
 
0.188 
 
0.195 
 
0.185 
 
0.177 
 
0.193 
 
n 293 144 149 270 130 140 
 
a. “Green” organizations include Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and WWFN. 
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Table 3. Selection Equation, Binomial Probit (target = 1, competitor = 0) 
Variable Estimated Coefficient – 
All Data (s.e.) 
Estimated Coefficient – 
Respondents Reporting WTP  
(s.e.) 
Long Model Short Model Short Model Long Model 
Constant -0.117 
(0.279) 
-0.164 
(0.173) 
-0.199 
(0.288) 
-0.201 
(0.182) 
With Decoy  
(binary, 1 if{c,t,d,}, 
zero if {c,t}) 
0.512 
(0.159)** 
0.512 
(0.158)** 
0.521 
(1.67)** 
0.522 
(0.166)** 
Household Income 
(continuous, set at 
midpoint of income 
brackets) 
0.00793 
(0.00601) 
0.00776 
(0.00579) 
0.0118 
(0.00642) 
0.0109 
(0.00612) 
Frequent visitors  
(binary, 1 if visits/year 
> 2, zero otherwise) 
-0.0667 
(0.222) 
 -0.134 
(0.234) 
 
Gender  
(binary, 1 if female, 
zero otherwise) 
0.0425 
(0.160) 
 0.063 
(0.167) 
 
Age 
(continuous, in years) 
-0.00150 
(0.00471) 
 -0.00081 
(0.00489) 
 
RSPB 
(binary, 1 if member of 
the Royal Society for 
the Protection of Birds, 
zero  otherwise.) 
1.058 
(0.252)** 
1.046 
(0.250)** 
1.106 
(0.272)** 
1.081 
(0.268)** 
Greens 
(binary, 1 if member of 
green organizationa, 
zero otherwise) 
-0.956 
(0.211)** 
-0.960 
(0.209)** 
-0.976 
(0.223)** 
-0.982 
(0.221)** 
n 293 293 270 270 
 
Note:  *  and **  denote 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Mean WTP Values (£’s) by Choice Set and Choice (s.d.)  
 C t 
{c,t} 15.45  
(21.31) 
18.49 
 (24.10) 
{c,t,d} 13.81  
(18.42) 
24.61 
(30.33) 
 
Note: As defined in the text and illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, c refers to the competitor, t 
refers to the target, and d refers to the decoy.  Note: d is asymmetrically dominated by t. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.  Treatment Effects Model, Corrected Tobit Specification 
Variable Tobit Regression, Accounting for Treatment Effect 
Coefficient Estimates (s.e.) 
Average Value Shift Value Shift by Choice 
Long Model Short Model Long Model Short Model 
Constant 2.67 
(6.87) 
5.69 
(5.44) 
4.96 
(6.87) 
8.15 
(5.48) 
Chose T -31.16 
(5.84)** 
-30.97 
(5.67)** 
-34.30 
(6.31)** 
-34.09 
(6.18)** 
With Decoy 9.58 
(4.08)** 
9.57 
(3.93)** 
  
D(Chose C)* D(decoy)   6.40 
(9.20) 
6.45 
(8.96) 
D(Chose T)*D(decoy)   16.23 
(6.15)** 
16.24 
(6.06)** 
Income 0.841 
(0.133)** 
0.838 
(0.118)** 
0.818 
(0.132)** 
0.813 
(0.117)** 
Frequent Visitor 22.94 
(4.31)** 
23.55 
(4.31)*** 
22.97 
(4.32)** 
23.58 
(4.31)** 
Gender (female =1) 2.86 
(3.60) 
 2.72 
(3.56) 
 
Age 0.041 
(0.102) 
 0.047 
(0.100) 
 
RSPB 10.95 
(4.88)* 
10.62 
(4.77)* 
8.91 
(4.88) 
8.57 
(4.80) 
Greens -13.41 
(5.38)** 
-13.27 
(5.28)* 
-11.31 
(5.33)* 
-11.18 
(5.20)* 
  28.32 
(1.12)** 
28.30 
(1.11)** 
28.26 
(1.15)** 
28.24 
(1.14)** 
  0.809 
(0.0474)** 
0.807 
(0.0473)** 
0.813 
(0.0480)** 
0.810 
(0.0471)** 
N 270 270 270 270 
Log Likelihood Function -1196.69 -1197.32 -1195.91 -1196.53 
 
Note:  *  and **  denote 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i 44 of the 270 WTP responses were ₤0.00.   Corrected ordinary least squares models, do not censor the WTP 
data at zero, provide qualitatively the same results as reported for the Tobit specification are available from the 
authors. 
ii As noted previously the econometric estimation was conducted using full information maximum likelihood 
procedures developed in Greene (2002). 
